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Introduction
The Central Intelligence Agency have been developing methods to explore possibilities
in the realm of espionage. As the further CIA explored, their tactic began to sway toward an
Agency of paramilitary. They often recruit locals with long term promises to gain their trust and
military cooperation. This tactic has its roots since the colonial era, where explorers hire locals
for guidance and protection. However, CIA brought this method back to life by not physically
deploy large number of their own combat forces, but to have the locals act as the proxy, and
perform various military, espionage, or insurgency. This project focus on talking about CIA’s
presence in French Indochina, and CIA’s first paramilitary operation. This special operation
started a special collaboration between the Hmong people in Laos and the CIA during the Cold
War. To present this collaboration in my project was to mainly discuss the possibility of future
presence of such paramilitary tactic maneuver and the impact of this collaboration in the region.
The most extensive paramilitary operations ever conducted by the CIA occurred in the
small Southeast Asian Kingdom of Laos. For no less than 13 years, the CIA directed its native
forces to fight the primary North Vietnamese units until the achievement of a standstill.
Although the nation eventually fell to the superior force of the communists, the underlying CIA
upheld its pride regarding its accomplishments in the Laos territory.1 Richard Helms, the CIA
director, later noted that this analogy entailed a primary, notable operation for the agency. The
operation required manpower and further achieved the incorporation of particularly competent
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manpower, despite being dangerous and difficult. The Director thus contended that the CIA
performed a superb job in Laos.

3

Chapter 1:

The United States and Southeast Asia

The Vietnam War mirrored the magnified Cold War that prevailed between the USSR
Amid this Cold War, the USSR and China contended with the constraints imposed on them by
the fighting states.2 Protests commenced in China as the Chinese targeted the disintegration of
the stalemate and the eradication of the barriers that obstructed economic development in the two
states.
The 1954 Geneva Conference, as well as the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel,
affirmed Laos’ status as an independent state. Nonetheless, the country would encounter
attempted rule from the Royal Lao Government (RLG), most notably from Vientiane, alongside
the Mekong River. The affiliates of the outstandingly pro-communist Pathet Lao would manage
to regroup, especially in the northern provinces, accruing to Sam Neua and Phong Saly, and wait
for integration into the underlying central regime.3 Nevertheless, the French encountered an
allowance to uphold military dominance in the country with the aim of training the FAR (Royal
Lao Army). Further, Laotian independence suited the United States’ policy, provided the
underlying government remained non-communist. Laos denoted one of the primary dominoes in
Southeast Asia, which was of great concern to President Eisenhower as well as to John Foster
Dulles, the Secretary of State.4 Although the nation had exhibited little of intrinsic value, its
underlying geographical position accounted for its focus at the center of the Cold War that
prevailed in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, if Laos fell to the communists, Thailand could be next,
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according to the domino theory. The consequential collapse of Thailand would result in
communist domination in Southeast Asia – and potentially beyond the extent of the region.
The Western RLG encountered threats from both an army mutiny as well as a North
Vietnamese-sponsored communist insurgent movement known as the Pathet Lao. This mutinous
RLG unit proved to be the army’s best, particularly due to its potential for combating the
superior powers of the dissident forces.5 Nonetheless, the majority of the army mirrored the
lethargy of the underlying officer corps, which emanated from the colonial elite that previously
served the French but now lacked the energy, or rather the legitimacy, for practical leadership.
Being aware of its military’s impotence, the RLG feared that requesting that the SEATO
(Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) intervene would provoke North Vietnamese incursions.
Nevertheless, Eisenhower realized the Laotian anxiety despite believing that once the nation fell
to the hands of the communists, extreme pressure would prevail on Thailand, South Vietnam,
and Cambodia.6 He considered Laos as so significant that he would intervene unilaterally as an
ultimate desperate hope. The MEO – more precisely called the Hmong – were a bitter, antiVietnamese mountain people who had emigrated from the Yunnan Province in southern China.
As their population grew to about half a million, they managed to become the core of an irregular
force that was fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) until February 1973. By this time, a
Laotian ceasefire followed the accord with Hanoi regarding the termination of the war prevalent
in South Vietnam. Invariably, under their mercurial, charismatic leader Vang Pao, the
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outstanding Hmong managed to evolve from a hit-and-run guerilla outfit into a significant light
infantry operation in the regiment.
The agency initially targeted its paramilitary events in Laos to save the nation from the
reign of North Vietnam and from Hanoi’s individual Laotian surrogate, or rather the Pathet Lao.
The preservation of a non-communist Laos invariably persisted as an American objective until
the collapse of South Vietnam rendered the question moot in 1975. Nonetheless, the overall
emphasis changed with time. By 1964, the primary point of contention emerged from the failure
of the North Vietnamese to withdraw their substantial underlying forces from Laos’ territory,
whereas American-supported military strategies targeted resisting encroachments by Hanoi.7
In addition, as the US notably committed its airpower to South Vietnam by 1964 and its
ground troops in 1965, American policymakers increasingly perceived Laos as an effective
sideshow to the planned extensive struggle between Hanoi and Saigon. Considering this
secondary operations’ theater, the antagonists’ planned ranks managed to reverse the situation
dominant in Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the mobile Viet Cong, as well as North Vietnamese
units, proved to frustrate the road-bound heavy infantry dominant in Saigon.8 On the other hand,
in Laos, the Hmong irregulars succeeded in traversing existing mountain trails as well as moving
by air with the aim of occupying primary high grounds to counteract Hanoi’s artillery and tanks.
This overturning of duties further reversed the seasonal transformation of tactics in Laos.
Invariably, the NVA strengthened during the dry spell, typically from November to May, and
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gave ground to Hmong operations once the rains had washed out the underlying primitive road
system.
The expanded Hmong forces targeted the defense of Hmong territory, notably in the
northeast mountains, in addition to diverting the significant North Vietnamese forces emanating
from South Vietnam. Moreover, alongside the establishment of ethnic Lao guerrilla battalions
occupying the Laotian panhandle, in 1968 the CIA commenced the activation of a contest
regarding Hanoi’s utilization of Laotian territory as the supply route to Cambodia and South
Vietnam.9 Furthermore, the CIA station in Vientiane operated as the executive agent of the
ambassador to conduct the war. This understanding of the CIA’s role emanated from the
reluctance of both Vientiane and Washington to end Laotian neutrality. This analogy would
result in the repeal of the Geneva agreements of 1962, an act that prohibited the underlying
foreign powers. However, the prohibition faced by the French further deprived them of the
possibility of upholding military dominance in Laos. Moreover, overtly performing the United
States combat forces, or rather military advisors, could imperil the foundation for a fairly
negotiated peace. The upshot entailed that, besides deploying its individual paramilitary
resources, the CIA frequently mediated between the Vientiane embassy and MACV in Saigon.
This capacity manifested in the preservation of the authority of the ambassador regarding covert
Laotian operations and the endeavor to receive the fair support of MACV, notably with combat
air missions.
The covert operations of the CIA in the Laotian territory are perceived to have
commenced in the 1950s, when US Special Forces facilitated the prevalence of programs central
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to training the Hmong soldiers.10 The training notably entailed the familiarization of Hmong
individuals with the use of C-119s, various weaponry materials, and also other special war
troops. Furthermore, the CIA also trained Hmong soldiers to fly aircraft so that the team could
secure effective pilots and copilots from the Hmong population and facilitate the success of the
Secret War. According to several historical records, the Long Tieng airfield and military base in
Laos was substantial in implementing covert and humanitarian operations during the Vietnam
War.11 Long Tieng proved to be a scheduled region that was long utilized by the American
government via the CIA to perform several operations during the Vietnam War. Further, Long
Tieng was operated by Laotians and was situated in the northern province Xiangkhouang.
Cooperation between France and the United States in Vietnam commenced in 1953,
when French colonial forces requested air transport assistance from the American government.
The French colonial legislature dominant in Indochina realized by April 1953 that it was losing
the majority of its colonial states, which compelled the French government to reconsider the
integration of appropriate strategic techniques capable of empowering their military forces in
Vietnam.12 As a result, with the goal of applying a robust military force in Indochina, the French
government considered the application of practical military intervention approaches, including
the use of heavy weaponry such as tanks. A problem arose in transporting such military weapons
from their state of interest to Indochina. The French government then opted to seek assistance
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from the US government, which had initially established a robust military base. The French
government then requested assistance from the Americans to transport heavy weaponry to Laos.
President Eisenhower at first displayed reluctance to assist the colonial French
government in the transmission of heavy weaponry by air to Laos, despite the French
government declaring that requesting assistance did not reflect an intention to colonize Laos.
resident Eisenhower later decided to provide Civil Air Transport (CAT) for the French
government to satisfy their requests.13 The support that the American government provided to the
French government in this moment was appropriately code-named SQUAW. With the goal of
eradicating any future issues linked to military operations, the US Air Force notably received
directions from the government to offer sterile C-119s to the French legislature.
Nevertheless, the success of these efforts was generally evident, even if only due to
White House intervention. Further, the US Air Force, as well as the Navy, offered indispensable
air support to the irregulars, who bore the majority of the burden linked to ground combat in
Laos. The status quo, by 1973, in Laos survived until Saigon fell in May 1975, an act that also
led to collapse in Vientiane and Phnom Penh.14 However, terminal failure, in Laos at least, was
not a sufficient criterion for judging the quality of the effort central to a lost cause. The
performance of the CIA in Laos was invariably dominated by flaws, but the tale of the Secret
War in the territory portrays an admirable record of flexible economic management and sound
tactical judgment.
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The military assistance granted to the French government further progressed until 1954,
after which the French government again requested aid from the American government.
Nonetheless, the second request was somewhat strategic, since the French government requested
assistance regarding the use of the American military base Dien Bien Phu, which had been
isolated. In addition, Air America amounted to CIA front companies facilitating covert
operations in Laos.15 The tale of Air America commenced in 1950, when the CIA decided that it
required air transport potentially adequate for performing covert operations, notably in Asia, and
supporting American policy goals. In August 1950, the CIA purchased the assets of CAT, a
China-based airline, launched after WWII by General Claire L. Chennault and Whiting Willauer.
CIA’s Purpose in Laos
The war performed by the CIA in Laos was largely a failure, similar to the war that the
US military waged in the Vietnamese territory. Despite being a significant conflict of American
history, the war dominant in Laos was granted a fair degree of ignorance at the time and
forgotten afterward. Despite the war being forgotten, this analogy does not overwrite its
importance. The invisibility of the Laotian war has masked its persisting influence on the US
approach to subsequent fighting and lying about its conflicts. According to Kurlantzick, a toxic
brew of relatively good intentions dominated Laos at that time.16 A debacle emanated from
unrealistic expectations, egos, and geopolitics. It is quite challenging to recall that for both John
F. Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower, Laos was far more significant than Vietnam, since the
United States succeeded France as the key Western power intervening in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, a primary downside of mid-Indochina notably safeguarding the US ally Thailand
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from communist inroads was its emergence among the poorest nations internationally, freed
from the colonial control of the French in 1954 after France was defeated at Dien Bien Phu.
In addition, Laos was further subdivided internally, notably between the numerous upcountry mountain clans, who remained largely independent, and the lowland Laotians who
regulated the monarchical government.17 The independence of the up-country mountain tribes
could effectively prevail if they did not encounter ignorance from the rulers of the country. Laos
became a countrywide target of the outstanding communist regime, especially in Hanoi, which
yielded support for the indigenous communist group Pathet Lao.
Considering the anti-communist mountain clans in Laos, Hmong individuals emerged as
the most willing to engage in a large-scale fight, besides proving to be the best fighters.
Nonetheless, the CIA latched onto Vang Pao, the Hmong population’s leader, in 1961, who then
turned his tireless energy into a well-planned attack on the North Vietnamese as well as on
Pathet Lao. In addition, the CIA-run Operation Momentum further based its design upon the
Hmong approach of guerrilla fighting.18 This approach allowed these fighters to surprise and
destroy small teams of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese fighters. Further, early success served
to secure Vang Pao, along with his American handlers, and transform their thinking into the
ideology that the Hmong people were capable of mounting larger operations, including actually
holding and taking territory. This analogy compelled Vang Pao to demand US air support to
assist him to uphold control over large regions, especially in the central plain of jars.
At the termination of the war in Laos, the US had conducted over a half a million
airstrikes that left a devastated stretch of land, pockmarked by unexploded ordnance. The success
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of Vang Pao finally marked him as a key target for a concerted North Vietnamese commitment
regarding the destruction of his foundation in the northern region of Laos. Washington decided
that the situation was essentially hopeless and hence left a large population of frantic Hmong
citizens desperate to clamber onto the departing US Air Force transports amid the pullout of the
Americans in 1973.19 Furthermore, US involvement in Laos included a contingent of larger-thanlife figures, such as the hard-drinking Tony “Poe” Poshepny, who inhabited the mountain upcountry with additional Laotian tribes. These tribes notably fought side-by-side with his recruits
and provided bounties for the ears of Pathet Lao; he also collected an individual army, resulting
in claims that he was the real-life inspiration for Colonel Kurtz. This begs the question of
whether Laos was the forerunner of the current style of conducting secret wars. I concur with
Kurlantzick, who shares this thinking. Paramilitary operations amounted to only a small portion
of the long-established CIA, and yet the perceived first success in Laos assisted in changing its
institutional focus and establishing a propensity toward combat in Latin America by the 1980s
and in the Middle East in the 21st century.
Nevertheless, the war in Laos further witnessed the commencement of the outsourcing,
training, and occasional deployment of security forces to individual contractors. Further, the
CIA’s fabled Air America event transformed the nature of the small, individually directed war
regarding the CIA station, Bill Lair, into a massive logistical operation, recruiting new parttimers who understood neither the culture of the CIA nor that of Laos.20 Currently, Backwater, as
well as other individual security companies, inhabit key, yet frequently invisible, roles in US
wars abroad.
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In conjunction with this, the most durable legacy regarding the Laotian war may prove to
be that American officials repeatedly and brazenly deceived Congress.21 This description is
analogous to that attributed to US Ambassador William Sullivan, who micromanaged the
ongoing war between 1964–1969 prior to being called before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee several times. This perceived lack of support for government legitimacy has
compelled the CIA to become the “bête noire” of conspiracy theorists, despite going unremarked
on by several researchers.
The tragedy experienced by the Hmong people is dominant in their narrative. The
discussion of the Laotian government, especially in Vientiane, must possess a minor role in the
overarching story, as with Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese, about whom few lessons can be
deduced accordingly. The feeling of a larger vacuum in the narrative is further exacerbated by an
effective lack of maps that could aid citizens in situating Southeast Asian and Laotian
geography.22 Nearly four decades after the war’s denouement, the Laotian war continues to
resonate in American foreign policy as a precursor to the CIA’s centrality to paramilitary events,
the utilization of contractors amid combat zones, and the deliberate misguidance of
Congressional committees by executive officials.
The Effect of the Hmong-CIA Collaboration on Government Policies
The alliance between the CIA and the Hmong has greatly shaped current legislative
policies. The Laotian war (1961-1975) formed the basis of the integration of the CIA and Hmong
individuals, as well as the agency’s allies, once it involved the Hmong in fighting the communist
Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. Nonetheless, the initial objective of upholding a
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democratic and governable Laos transformed as the conflict in Southeast Asia magnified. Most
of the American leaders began to perceive the covert operation as less an issue of saving Laos
and more an approach to killing and maiming the North Vietnamese and hence assisting the war
in Vietnam.23 Further, Vang Pao, as the Hmong general, operated devotedly, even when some of
his objectives exceeded his grasp. Moreover, two CIA lifers proved to loathe one another: case
officer Lair and Tony Poe, paramilitary officer. Lair had a robust belief in the fighting force of
the Hmong individuals and argued for this in Washington, D.C.
The Secret War and its Effects
The most crucial assets of the CIA during the Secret War entailed Long Tieng and Laos,
which were significant due to their geographical position. Invariably, the geographical location
of Laos motivated the CIA to establish a site that was unlikely to be detected due to its
mountainous characteristics, which paved way for the CIA to further introduce the Long Tieng
airfield, which became one of the busiest airfields internationally. The favorability of the place
was further linked to the idea that it was isolated and thus had a small population of individuals,
a condition that made Laos suitable for the conduction of CIA operations.24 The Long Tieng
airfield was among the largest US installation sites in foreign countries. The topographical nature
of Laos defined its favorability, especially for the facilitation of effective training programs.
Nevertheless, the site was further surrounded by three-sided limestone hills, which made it less
accessible by road transport in general, particularly when the area was encountering unfavorable
weather conditions. This extreme inaccessibility was a key merit for the CIA, since the
probability of receiving an attack from the North Vietnamese was quite low. The CIA thus
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considered the area a favorable region to form a base for launching their war against the
communists in Southeast Asia.
In their method of ending in the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese carved a
transportation maze of routes via the jungles of Laos, establishing a substantial supply linkage,
later called the Ho Chi Minh Trail.25 Moreover, Laos dominated the civil war, notably between
Pathet Lao and the RLG. Seeking to disrupt the North’s supply routes, the United States enlisted
the assistance of the RLG’s highest-ranking Hmong general, Vang Pao. He proved to welcome
American guns, expertise, and money to assemble thousands of guerrilla fighters from the
mountains. Jointly, they would attack a shared adversary – communists.
The partnership was successful to a degree. Invariably, Vang Pao’s troops achieved a
high reputation for excelling as fierce jungle fighters capable of rescuing downed American
aircrews, fought the communists to a stalemate, and collected military intelligence. 26 The efforts
amounted to the CIA’s largest covert operation until the agency funded the Mujahedin in
opposition to the Soviets in Afghanistan. By 1969, CIA director Richard Helms informed
President Richard Nixon that the Hmong fighters had 39,000 troops involved in active fighting.
Nonetheless, casualties were many, since the forces of Vang Pao were utilizing teens of less than
13 to fill recruitment vacancies. This massive effort was further obscured from the US public for
several years prior to being perceived as the Secret War, wherein the Hmong mercenaries acted
as the secret army.
The Laotian war affected foreign policy to a great extent beyond determining the
approach through which the United States has fought since then. In conjunction with this, Laos
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proved to be far more critical strategically than Vietnam. The division of Laos created a loophole
for its attack by communists such as Pathet Lao.27 The guerrilla approach was quite useful for the
CIA to claim victory upon the Pathet Lao. The effectiveness of this technique was central to the
idea that the Hmong soldiers hardly found the place quite raided regarding supply lines and
shipments. The CIA provided the technical support necessary for Hmong soldiers to actively
engage in the fight. Laos further received aid from private contractors and paramilitary teams,
who granted them a concise upper hand to facilitate their victory against the North Vietnamese.
Nevertheless, the tragedy that befell the Hmong guerrilla soldiers further resonates now, even
after the Secret War, in addition to being a durable reminder regarding the battles that once
occurred. A further challenge entailed lack of error-free and detailed maps, a condition that
activated a feeling of an untold tale, since there was an improper approach toward keeping
records and investigating events after they occurred.28 With the assistance of Air America as key
implements, the CIA managed to supply no less than 45 million pounds of foodstuff to assist in
feeding the Hmong soldiers during the war. The air transport further facilitated the movement of
effective troops to ensure the adequate equipment of the Hmong soldiers to counter the North
Vietnamese. The success of the Hmong soldiers hinged upon several aspects, including the
introduction of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) and the Programs Evaluation
Office (PEO) in Laos to facilitate the effective supply of services, such as military aid.
In addition, after the fall of Saigon, the United States abandoned the Hmong secret army.
By 1975, around 10,000 Hmong individuals had been slaughtered at the hands of Pathet Lao, the
ascendant. Other Hmong individuals left Laos and fled to Thailand as well as the United States
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in search of security. In 1977, Washington officially recognized the valor of the guerrilla
fighters. A small stone with copper plaque was placed to represent the honor of the Hmong
fighters between the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the eternal flame of John F. Kennedy in
Arlington National Cemetery.29 However, the plaque has not done much regarding the resolution
of the Hmong’s plight in Southeast Asia. Several thousand Hmong individuals inhabit povertystricken regions in Thailand, while a few armed bands continue to live in the remaining Laotian
highlands after declining to surrender to the Laotian government. Hmong refugees outside Laos
remain worried, since they are aware that the rulers of their homeland still hold a substantial
grudge against them. Vang Pao has an interest in returning home from California and assisting in
reconciling the communist government and the Hmong in Vientiane.
After the resumption of power by the communists in Laos, the rulers perceived Hmong
individuals as their adversaries. The primary reason behind this argument is that the Hmong
people, under the leadership of General Vang Pao, joined hands with the CIA to fight
communism in Laos and counter North Vietnamese efforts. The problem primarily affected
Hmong individuals after US forces withdrew. At that moment, the United States facilitated the
escape of its individual forces and also the top-ranking Hmong soldiers, including Vang Pao.30
Those who remained endeavored to seek safe refugee camps in other states. The primary
challenges subsequently faced by the Hmong included poor financial stability, food inadequacy,
and lack of medical care, since there were no adequate facilities to meet the care needs of the
Hmong people.
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Universally, the collaboration between the Hmong and the CIA was central to countering
the communist effort that prevailed in Southeast Asia. Despite affirming the domino theory,
President Eisenhower provided substantial support and equipment for the Hmong in preparation
for the war against the North Vietnamese. The United States planned the war effectively, via the
CIA, and managed to train the Hmong soldiers in guerrilla techniques that were unfamiliar to the
North Vietnamese. This action formed a basis for defeating the North Vietnamese. The supply of
effective tankers, ground troops, and C-119s were among the top facilitative approaches that the
CIA enacted via the CAT program to ensure the availability of weaponry in Laos. The strategic
selection of Laos as the launching place for the war revealed the CIA’s keenness to plan in
advance for the war. The topographical and geographical location of Laos assures its favorability
for the housing of warriors. The contention between the United States, USSR, French
government, and China formed the basis of the great powers that were rivals before the
emergence of the Vietnam War. The effective training of the Hmong guerrillas facilitated the
successful execution of the CIA’s well-planned covert operation in Laos and its pattern of
operational need insights in the future to ensure that the execution of operations results in the
minimum possible damage and is minimally replicable.31 The efficiency of the pattern can be
enhanced, depending on the adversary’s locality and preparedness.
French Pursuit of US Aid in Indochina
The American and French relationship in Vietnam began in 1953 when French colonial
forces requested air transport assistance from the US government. In April 1953, the French
colonial government based in Indochina was losing the bulk of its colonial territory, which
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reinforced the French government’s consideration of integrating effective strategic approaches to
empower their military forces, especially in Vietnam. Therefore, with the aim of establishing a
strong military force in Indochina, the French government had to consider applying strong
military intervention strategies, including the use of heavy weaponry such as tanks. Although the
French government had considered applying such strategies, they had not yet determined how to
transport the military weapons from their region of choice to Indochina. Due to the lack of a
convenient alternative, the French government, via some of its key officials, had to approach the
US government, which had by then established a strong military setting. The French government
requested that the US government, through its military, help the French colonial government in
transporting heavy military weaponry to Laos.
The American interests in the early 1950s and late 1940s did not, however, entail
supporting Vietnam’s efforts to gain independence trending under a nationalist possessed with
communist leanings. Nonetheless, the dominance of active communist rebellions in Malaya and
the Philippines and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 yielded grave
concern among American officials. President Eisenhower invariably explained the connection
between Vietnam’s condition and that of the rest of Southeast Asia via the metaphor of falling
dominoes. The metaphor revealed that if one nation fell to communism, then the other nations
would surely follow. The US further required French aid in developing NATO as well as
rebuilding West Germany, and consequently, the United States supported the failing French
regime dominant in Indochina. By the time the Korean War armistice manifested in 1953,
America was already committed, in an irrevocable manner, to efforts to defend the French
against the increasingly aggressive forces of Viet Minh. The move to assist the French
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government was notably associated with a variety of reasons on the US side.32 A primary reason
that the government was forced to assist the French government is notably attributed to the
domino theory, whereby the US believed that if Vietnam was captured by communism, the rest
of the countries in Southeast Asia would follow. Therefore, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson had to send troops to Vietnam to assist the French government in combating the
troops in North America. Although the US government was convinced that they possessed
sufficient justification to indulge in this war, American citizens opposed the idea of participating
by claiming that it was a civil war and thus the government did not need to intervene. The idea of
the French legislature to request for assistance from the US government was then supported by
various individuals, including General J. Lawton Collins, among other government personnel
who argued that losing the rest of South Asia was unwise. On the French side, General Ely was
the key player in requesting American aid in their operations in Indochina.
The isolation of the French defenders and the tightening of the formation surrounding
them represented a critical condition that compelled the French to request, in their desperation,
American aid. Nonetheless, the most hawkish regarding American aid were Admiral Radford
(the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Richard Nixon (the Vice-President, who exhibited no
political might). Further hawks included the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
who displayed obsessions with the crusade against communism. More reserved was President
Eisenhower, but he nonetheless held a press meeting in April and specifically proclaimed the
little known domino theory for the potential spread of communism from one nation to another.
He stated that “you exhibit several dominoes set up, you further knock over the first domino, and
what will notably prevail to the last domino is the surety that it will fairly go over in a quick
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mode.” He further added, “hence you could possess a commencement of disintegration that
would bear the highly profound influences.”
Nevertheless Saturday, April 3, 1954 was marked in American history as “the day the
country’s government did not go to war.” During that day, Dulles convened with Congressional
leaders, who proved adamant that they would not support any military intervention unless Britain
was also engaged. Eisenhower notably sent a written document to the Prime Minister of Britain,
Winston Churchill, issuing a substantial warning regarding the repercussions to the West if Dien
Bien Phu fell. At that moment, at a conference in Paris, Dulles supposedly delivered his shocking
proclamation to the French government regarding tactical nuclear weapons. According to facts,
Dulles was not authorized to initiate such a provision, and little evidence exists to support that he
performed the action. It seems possible that in the hasty atmosphere of the time, the panicstricken French may have misunderstood him, or rather, his utterances may have been
mistranslated.
US Air Support to French Indochina
According to Wetterhahn33, the French government had to request that the US
government allow use of their air transport facilities, which would be used to transport heavy
weaponry equipment, including tanks, to Laos, which was one of their hard-pressed regions in
1953. With the aim of convincing the US government, the French government argued that
assistance in transporting weaponry would decide whether the Laotian region was lost or held.
During the drafting of this request, President Eisenhower led the country and was, by then,
reluctant to assist the French government. Despite his unwillingness to offer overt support to the
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French government, the president later decided to offer CAT to the French government to fulfill
their request. At that time, the role of CAT had been transformed from clandestine to covert.
According to Leary34, the support offered by the US government to the French government
during this time was notably code-named operation SQUAW. With the aim of avoiding any
military convectional-related issues in later days, the US Air Force was directed by the
government to provide sterile C-119s to the French government to help transport their military
equipment. Notably, “sterile” in this case involved removing all military identifications from
transport planes to avoid their being traced back to the US government. The C-119 was
considered convenient because it could transport the heavy loads of equipment needed by the
French troops in Laos.
Because CAT personnel was less familiar with the C-119, US Air Force troops based at
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines needed to provide a quick but intense training program to
CAT members before they could conduct the assigned mission. In May 1953, the French troops,
with the help of CAT officials, held several covert and overt operations, including six means of
transport, which notably involved the parachuting of supplies and military equipment to the
French forces in Laos and the Gia Lam airbase situated outside Hanoi. Operation SQUAW is
believed to have lasted for several days, with the US government, through its Air Force officials,
helping to airdrop various equipment to French troops based in Laos.
According to Lansdale35, the military aid offered to the French government is perceived
to have continued until 1954, when the French government again requested that the US
government aid their forces. Their request occurred in January 1954, whereby the French
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government asked US government officials to assist with their base that had been isolated at
Dien Bien Phu. Again, CAT was allocated to the French military officials after the US
government provided 24 pilots intended to fly 12 C-119 aircraft. According to historians, from
the military perspective, the C-119s were to be maintained by US Air Force ground crews in the
Hanoi region ,which was then considered to be CAT’s Bi airfield. The government was, by then,
to offer their support to French troops located at Dien Bien Phu, whereby the mission lasted from
March until May 7th, when Dien Bien Phu fell, which resulted in the deaths of two CAT pilots
and the injury of a military official. Nonetheless, the operations perpetrated by CAT officials are
believed to have continued even after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, whereby the C-119s were
deployed in isolating French outposts from the area.36

Post WWII
The victory of WWII facilitated US military supremacy. The US suffered much less
compared to the other non-Axis countries, which incurred severe costs from the destruction of
land, enormous population decreases, the invasion of colonies, and the breakdown of military
forces. No country in the world affected by the war could function on its own. On the other hand,
with the blessing of geological advantage, the US did not suffer much due to the distance
between the war’s primary battlegrounds and the US mainland. After the war officially ended,
European countries requested US aid in the restoration of Europe. The US executed the Marshall
plan in July 1947 to aid participating countries in the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation in finance, technology, equipment, and related aspects. With the help of the US, the
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European countries were able to rebuild. As the result of such close cooperation, NATO was
formed, creating a giant among the world with great power, in the hope of defending member
nations from future Soviet invasion.
On the other hand, whereas the US was focusing on the Old World, the Soviet Union
thrived by resolving its domestic issues among its territories, while simultaneously settling
historical issues with China and Korea. The communists were also eager to spread into further
lands, to extend their reach in the world. They were focused on Southeast Asia. At the time,
Southeast Asian countries were still very rural and agriculture-dependent, the perfect virgin land
for powerful nations to shape them as desired. They possessed very little self-defense capability
and few citizens capable of fighting; instead, they greatly relied on metropolitan countries to
provide military support. Laos, at the time, was the centerpiece of French Indochina. Being
surrounded by many other colonies allowed Laos to become a transportation center.
On a larger scale, the Vietnam War was simply a reflection of the larger Cold War
between the US and USSR. During the Cold War, China and the USSR needed to contend with
the restrictions imposed by participating countries. Protests begun in China attempted to break
the stalemate and remove the restrictions that hindered the development of economies, as the two
fighting countries occupied each other. China was in a bid to initiate détente among the enemies.
At this point, outside parties disengaged and worked toward individual ends, with Mao opting to
provide China its industrial revolution. This stalemate created a group of men who controlled
most of the politics and excluded agents of change. This enabled further fighting, especially in
Laos.
Laos has a turbulent history. The pushed wave in the grand scene of human activities in
the 19th and 20th centuries. After being subjugated to Thailand for nearly a century, Laos was
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then passed to the French, as the new pet for the vigorous plan for French Indochina. The
occupation of Japan in WWII was a sign that allowed Laos to realize that they should no longer
abide being violently ruled by French for nearly a century and wanted by the Japanese for
decades. Laos as a country was never in peace, and it acted as the helpless battlefield of the
French-Japanese War. In 1954, when Laos declared its independence from French Indochina, it
was still very much intertwined with the fate of the Asian Arena. I intend to explore the very
essence and the prime examples of how imperialism raged throughout Asian countries, whether
an unindustrialized country such as Laos controls its own destiny, and the relationship between
the French and the US during the Vietnam War.
The activities of the CIA within the Laotian region are believed to have begun in the
1950s, when US Special Forces initiated several programs focused on training Hmong soldiers in
techniques for use in unconventional warfare. Based on several historical manuscripts, the Long
Tieng airfield in Laos played a significant role, particularly in establishing humanitarian and
even covert operations during the Vietnam War. According to Wetterhahn37, Long Tieng is a
secluded place in Laos’ northern central highlands, which was long used by the US government
through the CIA to conduct many operations during the Vietnam War. Notably, Long Tien was a
military base operated by Laotians and which was located in the northern province of
Xiangkhouang. This paper therefore categorically focuses on further elaborating upon CIA
activities in Laos during the Vietnam War, which is initiated by presenting a well-researched and
comprehensive background history of the US intervention in Laos.
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According to Leary38, CIA operations in Laos are believed to have been initiated in the
1950s and became one of the largest paramilitary operations in the agency’s history. One aspect
that categorically favored the success of the CIA’s involvement in the Secret War relates to the
strategic, or rather, the geographical position of the region, Laos. Long Tieng, which was
referred to as Lima Site 98 by the CIA, was a Laotian military airbase situated within the
Xiangkhouang province. The airbase was considered one of the best places that allowed the US
government, through the CIA, to launch countless attacks and both overt and covert operations
during the Vietnamese and Laotian civil wars. According to Wetterhahn39, the official
involvement of the CIA in Long Tieng began in 1962, after they established headquarters in the
Long Tieng Valley that would be used by Major General Vang Pao in perpetrating his strategic
military operations against North Vietnam. Before the US officially got involved in the Vietnam
War, they had initially been recruited to assist the French government in conducting several
covert and overt operations while Vietnam was still a French colony. The subsequent section
analyzes the timeline of CIA involvement in Vietnam through Long Tieng, beginning with the
agency’s well-established relationship with the French government.
The US and French relationship in Vietnam was initiated in 1953, when French colonial
forces requested air transport assistance from the US government. In April 1953, the French
colonial government based in Indochina was losing the bulk of its colonial territory, which
forced the French to consider integrating effective strategic approaches that would empower their
military forces, especially in Vietnam (Ferguson, 2010). Therefore, with the aim of establishing a
strong military force in Indochina, the French government needed to consider applying strong
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military intervention strategies, including the use of heavy weaponry such as tanks. Although the
French government had considered applying such military strategies, they had not yet
determined how to transport those military weapons from their region of choice to Indochina.
Due to the lack of any convenient alternative, the French government, through some key
officials, were compelled to approach the U.S. government, which had by then established a
strong military setting. The French government requested US military aid to help the French
colonial government in transporting heavy weaponry to Laos.
According to Wetterhahn40, the French government had to make a request to the U.S.
government for their air transport facilities which would be used to transport heavy weaponry
equipment’s including tanks to Laos which was one of their hard-pressed regions back in the
year 1953. With the aim of convincing the U.S. government, the French government attested and
emphasized that their help in transporting weaponry would no doubt mean either losing or
holding the Laotian region. During the making of this request, President Eisenhower was in the
leadership of the country and was by then reluctant to assist the French government. Besides
being unwilling to offer his over support to the French government, the president later decides to
offer Consolidated Airdrop Tool (CAT) to the French government to fulfill their request. During
this moment, the role of the CAT had been transformed from being clandestine to become
covert. According to Leary41, the support offered by the U.S. government to the French
government during this time was notably code-named operation SQUAW. With the aim of
avoiding any military convectional-related issues in later days, the U.S. air force was directed by
the government to provide sterile C-119 to the French government to help transport their military
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equipment. Notably, ‘sterile’ in this case involved removing all military identifications from the
transport plane to avoid being traced back to the U.S. government. The C-119 was considered
convenient bearing the fact that it had the ability to transport heavy loads of equipment needed
by the French troops in Laos.
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Chapter 2:

US and France in Southeast Asia

French Pursuit of US Aid in Indochina
The U.S. and the French relationship in Vietnam kicked off in 1953 when the French
colonial forces had requested for air transport help from the U.S. government. In April 1953, the
French colonial government based in Indochina was losing most of its colonial territory which
enforced the French government to consider integrating effective strategic approaches that would
empower their military forces especially in Vietnam (Ferguson, 2010). Therefore, with the aim
of establishing a strong military force in Indochina, the French government had to consider
applying strong military intervention strategies including the use of heavy weaponry such as the
use of tanks. Although the French government had the idea of applying such strategies, they had
not yet figured a way in which they would transport those military weapons from their region of
choice to Indochina. Due to lack of a convenient alternative, the French government, via some of
its key officials had to turn up to the U.S. government which had by then established a strong
military setting. The French government requested for the U.S. government through its military
to help the French colonial government in transporting the heavy military weaponry to Laos.
The American interests in the early 1950s and late 1940s didn’t, however, entail
supporting Vietnam’s effort in gaining independence trending under a nationalist possessed with
communist leanings. Nonetheless, active communist rebellions dominant in Malaya as well as
the Philippines, and also the setting up of the People’s China Republic in 1949, yielded a great
concern in the American officials. Invariably, President Eisenhower clearly explained the
connection between Vietnam’s condition and that of the other Southeast Asia via the metaphor of
the falling dominoes. The metaphor revealed that if one nation fell to communism, then the other
nations would definitely follow. The US further necessitated French aid in developing the NATO

29

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as well as rebuilding West Germany. Consequently, the
United States supported the fairly failing French regime dominant in Indochina. By the moments
the Korean War armistice manifested in 1953, America was already committed, in an irrevocable
manner, to the effort of defending the French notably against the growingly aggressive forces of
Viet Minh. The move to assist the French government was notably associated with a variety of
reasons on the U.S. side.42 One of the primary reasons explaining why the government was
forced to assist the French government notably accrues to the Domino theory whereby the U.S.
believed that if Vietnam was captured by the communism then the rest of the countries in
Southeast Asia would follow. Therefore, President Eisenhower Kennedy and Johnson had to take
their fight to Vietnam by assisting the French Government to combat the troops in North
America. Even though the U.S. government was convinced that they had enough reasons to
indulge in this war, the U.S. citizens opposed the idea of participating in this war by claiming
that it was a civil war and thus the government did not have to intervene. The idea of the French
legislature to request for assistance from the U.S. government was then supported by different
individuals including General J. Lawton Collins among other government personnel who argued
that losing the rest of South Asia was a bad idea. On the French’s side, General Ely was the key
player in requesting for U. S’s help in their operations in Indochina.
The cutting off the French defenders and the tightening of the noose surrounding them
implied a critical condition that compelled the French to request, in its desperation, for American
help. Nonetheless, the most hawkish regarding the States’ aide was Admiral Radford (the Chair
of the Staff’s Joint Chiefs) and Richard Nixon (the Vice-President who exhibited no political
might). Additionally, hawkish entailed the American secretary of the State John Foster Dulles,
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who encountered obsessions from the crusade notably in opposition to communism. Further
reserved was President Eisenhower. He nonetheless awarded a press meeting in April and
specifically proclaimed the less known ‘Domino Theory’ regarding the potential spread of
communism notably from one nation to the other. His speech was that “you exhibit several
dominoes set up, you further knock over the first domino, and what will notably prevail to the
last domino is the surety that it will fairly go over in a quick mode.” He further added that,
“hence you could possess a commencement of disintegration that would bear the highly
profound influences” (BBC, 2018)
Nevertheless, on Saturday date 3, April 1954, this day went down in the United States’
history as ‘the day the country’s government didn’t go to war.’ During that day, Dulles convened
with Congressional leaders who proved to be adamant they would hardly support any military
intervention but could only portray their support once Britain was also engaged. Eisenhower
notably sent a written document (letter) to the Prime Minister of Britain (Winston Churchill)
issuing a substantial warning regarding the repercussions of the West once Dien Bien Phu fell.
During this moment, at a conference in Paris, Dulles supposedly delivered his astonishing
provision to the French government regarding tactical nuclear weapons. According to facts,
Dulles was not authorized to initiate such a provision and there is little evidence to support that
he performed the action. It seems potential that in the febrile surrounding of such days, the panicstricken French may have misunderstood him or rather his utterances may have encountered a
loss in the translation phase.
US Air Support to French Indochina
United States Air, an airline that is confidentially possessed by the CIA, was key to the
facilitation of the agency’s operations in Laos. By the summer of 1970, the airline had acquired
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two dozen twin-engine transports, an additional two dozen STOL (short takeoff and landing)
aircraft, and some 30 helicopters that were dedicated to serving the operations center in Laos.
There were invariably no less than three hundred pilots, flight mechanics, air-freight specialists,
and copilots flying out from Laos, as well as Thailand. During 1970, the Air America crews
transported several thousand refugees and troops, in addition to flying emergency road-watch
teams.43 Additional flight activities included nighttime airdrop missions to the Ho Chi Minh and
the monitoring of sensors alongside established infiltration routes. Air America further
conducted a highly successful program of photo-reconnaissance besides, as well as several
clandestine missions utilizing night vision glasses and state-of-the-art electronic equipment. In
absence of Air America’s intervention, the efforts of the CIA to accomplish its covert operations
in Laos may not have been sustained.
The public image of Air America has not fared well. The actual Air America story began
in 1950, when the CIA decided to acquire air transport potential to perform its covert operations
in Southeast Asia. The central aim was to support American policy goals. In August 1950, the
CIA secretly bought the assets of CAT, an airline that was launched in China after WWII by
Whiting W. and General Claire, L. Chennault. Moreover, CAT went on to fly financial routes
throughout Asia, operating in every aspect as an individually owned financial airline. It
simultaneously offered airplanes and crews to facilitate confidential intelligence operations. 44
During the 1950s, the proprietary airline of the CIA, as it was termed in the lexicon of
intelligence, was deployed for several covert missions. During the Korean War, for instance, it
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facilitated no less than 100 risky flights to mainland China, carrying supplies and airdropping
agents.
In addition, CAT became further engaged in the French war in opposition to communist
insurgents, notably in Indochina. In April 1953, the French appealed to President Eisenhower for
the deployment of US Air Force C-119 crews and transports to fly tanks and heavy machinery to
their embattled forces in Laos.45 The French argued that such equipment might be the difference
between losing and holding Laos. Despite being reluctant to commit the American military to the
Indochina war, the Eisenhower administration was anxious to offer assistance to the French. This
resulted in the decision to utilize CAT pilots to sometimes fly airlifts in the US Air Forcesupplied C-119s. By early May, a team of CAT workers traveled to Clark Air Force Base in the
Philippines for three days of concentrated ground and flight school for those unfamiliar with C119s. By May 5th, now joined by the tricolored roundels of the French Air Force, they flew six
types of transport to the Gia Lam airbase outside of Hanoi.46 Moreover, Operation SQUAW
commenced the next day.
The operation progressed until July 16th, with CAT pilots making several airdrops to
French troops in Laos. As the Vietminh offensive, which entailed being due more shortly
following weather rather than French resistance, was waning, the CAT crews then withdrew.
Nevertheless, the war prevalent in Indochina continued to progress poorly for the French. By
November 1953, the French paratroopers managed to occupy Dien Bien Phu in the northwestern
region of Vietnam, around ten miles from the border, and set up an airhead. The commander of
the French military, Gen. Henri Navarre, wished to lure the underlying Vietminh into a battle,
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wherein superior French firepower could be utilized most effectively.47 Among the several
mistakes that the French made regarding the placement of their troops 220 miles from Hanoi,
their miscalculation of the air transport materials needed to supply their isolated forces was
central. The head of the French Air Transport Command in Indochina, Col. Jean-Luis Nicot,
lacked adequate aircrews that could satisfy the Army’s stipulations. Unless extra assistance could
be acquired, the French garrison could not be kept supplied.
In conjunction with this, in early January 1954, Mr. Washington alerted the CAT of a
potential return to Indochina. According to a contract approved by French authorities on March
3rd, CAT would supply 24 pilots to operate 12 C-119s that would be managed by US Air Force
personnel. Operations from Cat Bi airfield in Hanoi to Dien Bien Phu were underway as the
Vietminh commenced their assault on the French position. Nevertheless, between March 13th and
May 7th, CAT pilots flew 682 airdrop missions to the already beleaguered French troops. One
plane was shot down in early May, an event that resulted in the deaths of the two pilots. Further,
additional C-119s suffered heavy flak damage, and one pilot was severely wounded.48 In
addition, CAT operations progressed in Indochina, even after the seizure of Dien Bien Phu.
Notably, in the period between mid-May and mid-August, the C-119s dropped distributions to
isolated French outposts in addition to delivering loads throughout the nation. Furthermore, CAT
also supplied 12 functional C-46s for Operation COGNAC, the evacuation of civilians from
North Vietnam to the outer extent of South Vietnam in accordance with the signing of the
Geneva Agreement, which occurred in 21st 1954. In the period between August 22nd and
October 4th , CAT managed to fly 19,808 children, women, and men from North Vietnam. It
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further carried affiliates of the Saigon Military Mission of the CIA north to the 17th parallel.
However, endeavors by the CIA to establish stay-behind paramilitary networks, especially in the
northern region, proved futile.
According to Wetterhahn49 , the French government had to make a request to the U.S.
government for their air transport facilities which would be used to transport heavy weaponry
equipment’s including tanks to Laos which was one of their hard-pressed regions back in the
year 1953. With the aim of convincing the U.S. government, the French government attested and
emphasized that their help in transporting weaponry would no doubt mean either losing or
holding the Laotian region. During the making of this request, President Eisenhower was in the
leadership of the country and was by then reluctant to assist the French government. Besides
being unwilling to offer his over support to the French government, the president later decides to
offer CAT to the French government to fulfill their request. During this moment, the role of the
CAT had been transformed from being clandestine to become covert. According to Leary50, the
support offered by the U.S. government to the French government during this time was notably
code-named operation SQUAW. With the aim of avoiding any military convectional-related
issues in later days, the U.S. air force was directed by the government to provide sterile C-119 to
the French government to help transport their military equipment. Notably, ‘sterile’ in this case
involved removing all military identifications from the transport plane to avoid being traced back
to the U.S. government. The C-119 was considered convenient bearing the fact that it had the
ability to transport heavy loads of equipment needed by the French troops in Laos.
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Considering that the CAT personnel was less familiar with the C-119, the U.S. Airforce
military based at Clark Airforce Base in the Philippines had to offer a quick but intense training
program to the CAT members before they conducted the assigned mission. On May 1953, the
French troops with the help of CAT officials held several covert and overt operations including
six means of transport. These transports notably involved the parachuting of supplies and
military equipment to the French forces in Laos and Gia Lam airbase situated outside Hanoi.
Operation SQUAW is believed to have lasted for several days with the U.S. government through
its Airforce officials help to airdrop various equipment to the French troops based in Laos.
According to Lansdale51, the military aid offered to the French government is perceived
to have continued until the year 1954 after the French government had requested the U.S.
government to help their forces once again. Their request was made on January 1954 whereby
the French government asked the U.S. government officials to assist them with their base that
had been isolated at Dien Bien Phu. CAT was again allocated to the French military officials
after the U.S. government had provided 24 pilots intended to fly 12 C-119s aircraft. According to
historians based on military perspective, the C-199s were to be maintained by the United States
Air Force (USAF) ground crews at Hanoi region which was then considered to be CAT’s Bi
airfield. The government was by then to offer their support to French troops located at Dien Bien
Phu whereby the mission started from March until May 7th after Dien Bien Phu fell resulting to
the killing of two CAT pilots and the injuring of their one military officials. Nonetheless, the
operations perpetrated by the CAT officials are believed to have continued even after the fall of
Dien Bien Phu whereby the C-199s were deployed in isolating French outposts from the area.52
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CIA Front Companies – Air America
The story of the real Air America begins in 1950, when the CIA decided that it required
an air transport capability to conduct covert operations in Asia in support of US policy
objectives. In August 1950, the agency secretly purchased the assets of CAT, an airline that had
been started in China after World War II by Gen. Claire L. Chennault and Whiting Willauer.
Gen. Claire L. Chennault. CAT would continue to fly commercial routes throughout Asia, acting
in every way as a privately-owned commercial airline. At the same time, under the corporate
guise of CAT Incorporated, it provided airplanes and crews for secret intelligence operations. In
the 1950s, the CIA's air proprietary, as it was known in the lexicon of intelligence, was used for a
variety of covert missions. During the Korean War, for example, it made more than 100
hazardous overflights of mainland China, airdropping agents and supplies. CAT also became
involved in the French war against communist insurgents in Indochina. In April 1953, the French
appealed to President Eisenhower for the use of US Air Force C-119 transports and crews to fly
tanks and heavy equipment to their hard-pressed forces in Laos. "Having such equipment," the
French emphasized, "might mean the difference between holding and losing Laos."
While reluctant to commit American military personnel to the war in Indochina, the
Eisenhower administration was anxious to assist the French. This led to a decision to use CAT
pilots to fly an airlift in US Air Force-supplied C-119s. In early May, a group of CAT personnel
arrived at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for 72 hours of concentrated ground and flight
school on the unfamiliar C-119s. On 5 May, they flew six of the transports, now bearing the
tricolored roundels of the French Air Force, to Gia Lam airbase, outside Hanoi.
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Operation SQUAW began the next day. It continued until 16 July, with CAT pilots
making numerous airdrops to French troops in Laos. With the waning of the Vietminh offensive,
which was due more to the weather than to French resistance, the CAT crews were withdrawn.
Considering that CAT personnel was less familiar with the C-119, the U.S. Airforce military
based at Clark Airforce Base in the Philippines had to offer a quick but intense training program
to the CAT members before they conducted the assigned mission. On May 1953, the French
troops with the help of CAT officials held several covert and overt operations including six
means of transport. These transports notably involved the parachuting of supplies and military
equipment to the French forces in Laos and Gia Lam airbase situated outside Hanoi. Operation
SQUAW is believed to have lasted for several days with the U.S. government through its
Airforce officials help to airdrop various equipment to the French troops based in Laos.
The war in Indochina, however, continued to go badly for the French. In November 1953,
French paratroopers occupied Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Vietnam, 10 miles from the Laos
border, and established an airhead. Gen. Henri Navarre, the French military commander, wanted
to lure the Vietminh into a set piece battle in which superior French firepower could be used to
good effect. Among the many mistakes made by the French in placing their troops 220 miles
from Hanoi was their miscalculation of the air transport resources needed to keep their isolated
forces supplied. Col. Jean-Louis Nicot, head of the French Air Transport Command in
Indochina, lacked sufficient aircrews to meet the Army's demands. Unless additional assistance
could be obtained, the French garrison could not be kept supplied.
In early January 1954, Washington alerted CAT for a possible return to Indochina. Under
a contract signed with French authorities on 3 March, CAT would supply 24 pilots to operate 12
C-119s that would be maintained by US Air Force personnel. Operations from Hanoi's Cat Bi
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airfield to Dien Bien Phu got under way just as the Vietminh began their assault on the French
position. Between 13 March and the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, CAT pilots flew 682
airdrop missions to the beleaguered French troops. One plane was shot down in early May, and
the two pilots were killed; many other C-119s suffered heavy flak damage, and one pilot was
severely wounded.
CAT operations continued in Indochina after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Between midMay and mid-August, C-119s dropped supplies to isolated French outposts and delivered loads
throughout the country. CAT also supplied 12 C-46s for Operation COGNAC, the evacuation of
civilians from North Vietnam to South Vietnam following the signing of the Geneva Agreement
on 21 July 1954. Between 22 August and 4 October, CAT flew 19,808 men, women, and
children out of North Vietnam. It also carried members of the CIA's Saigon Military Mission
north of the 17th parallel. Attempts by the CIA to establish staybehind paramilitary networks in
the north, however, proved futile.
The war was very much run by the company, referring to the CIA. Most strategies and
rules of engagement came directly from them, as they coordinated attacks through intelligence
apparatus. The war in Laos influenced foreign policy greatly and determined how America has
conducted warfare ever since. Laos was far more critical strategically than Vietnam itself ever
was. Laos was divided, and this left it prime for the influence of indigenous communists such
Pathet Lao. The CIA, upon realizing this, searched for a tribe that could counter and fight Pathet
Lao. Guerrilla tactics were employed, as the soldiers did not find the place raided shipments and
supply lines. This was facilitated with technical support provided by the CIA. Excessive
bombing also occurred in the city, with estimates ranging as high as 500,000 airstrikes. Laos also
received assistance from the paramilitary and private contractors, who gave them a brief upper
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hand in their war against the Laotians. The tragedy that befell the Hmong fighters, however, still
resonates long after the war and is a long-lasting reminder of the battles that occurred. The lack
of accurate and detailed maps also left a feeling of a story untold, as there was no way to keep
track of the events as they unfolded. This trickled down to influence policy, with the CIA now
favoring paramilitary activity primarily involving contractors and secrecy, particularly
concerning Congressional committees and the lack of allegiance to allies once the order to
withdraw is given.
With the aim of succeeding with the initial plan, the CIA had to organize backup that
would enable the Hmong to effectively attack North Vietnam. Using implements such as Air
America, the CIA supplied over 45 million pounds of foodstuff to feed the Hmong while at war.
According to Leary53, the CIA was similarly able to offer transport means to the Hmong troops
while simultaneously conducting photo-reconnaissance programs, which significantly aiding the
direction of forces regarding strategies and directions. With the use of state-of-the-art
implements and night vision glasses supplied by the CIA, the trained troops could also conduct
several clandestine missions against North Vietnam. In addition to the humanitarian programs
directed to the troops, the CIA was also assigned the role of conducting a substantial bombing in
Laos for nine consecutive years (1964–1973). Leary54 attests to the US government, through the
CIA’s airline Air America and the US Air Force, being able to conduct over 550, 000 bombing
missions in nine years.
In 1955, the US was directly involved in major operations perpetrated throughout Laos,
especially after the introduction of the USOM. In 1955, the government also established a PEO
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in Laos that was specifically focused on ensuring that services such as military aid were
supplied. Notably, the PEO was specifically staffed by military officers who were then serving
and retired military men and by the CIA department, which covertly supported the hired military.
Both the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the PEO were specifically under the
USOM, which was assigned several different roles linked to militarism. Still, in 1955, the US
government, through USOM officials, initiated official plans to provide supplies to locals who
were threatened by famine. The supplies, which included rice and salt, were delivered by three
CAT C-46s, and by the end of the year, the CATs had delivered approximately 1,000 tons of
emergency foodstuff, which was specifically flown in over 200 missions. The supply of aid to
this region marked an important point in the occupation of Laos.
As with 1955, 1957 is also acknowledged as one of the historical periods of US
interventions in Laos. At the beginning of the year, the US government, through the CIA, had to
sign a new CAT contract, through which Bruce Blevins would be allowed to fly C-47s with the
primary aim of providing aid to the US Embassy in Vietnam.55 During his mission, Blevins
reported on poor conditions regarding the underdevelopment of technology in Laos and other
related challenges, including the radio navigation systems affecting the area, the lack of enough
control towers, and the ineffective runway in Laos. The government therefore, through the CIA,
had to covertly increase support to the region. In 1957, the US government noted the conflict
again occurring amid the Royal Laotian Guard and the communist Pathet Lao in Laos, which
affected the peaceful resolutions proposed during the beginning of the year. The government thus
needed to sign a new deal in which it would assist in the development of an effective peace
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resolution between the two groups and simultaneously aid in ceasing the conflict between the
two. The US government, through the CIA, primarily aimed to ensure that the conflict between
the two groups would not result in issues that would jeopardize the entire US plan regarding
Laos.
By 1958, the CIA had been given full responsibility by the US government to conduct
covert operations within Laos. The operations were originally proposed by the State Department,
which had to officiate the matter by articulating a document that would govern the covert
operations perpetrated both in Laos and in other regions, including Chile.56 The CIA was now
fully commissioned to operate in Laos without any interference from either the government or
the local militia. During this period, supplies from both CAT C-47S and C-46s were spotted in
Laos making drops that would aid many operations conducted by the CIA. Conversely, 1959 was
one of the few historical years that marked a full US intervention in Laos. The period is notably
associated with two Air Force historians, Richard R. Sexton and Victor B. Antony, who prepared
a 400-page document on how the US government would strategically use Laos to win battles.
Compared to other years, 1960 is now considered one of the most historical periods in the
US interventions in Laos. This can be explained because in this year, the US government,
through the CIA, introduced a mission with a code name, Erawan, which was a covert mission
perpetrated by the CIA that later resulted in the introduction of the Long Tieng airfield in Laos.
Project Erawan notably involved US Special Forces, who were by then entrusted with the role of
training Laotian soldiers in combat and warfare that could be used to fight the enemy. However,
although the CAT contingent was based in the Philippines and Japan, it did not arrive in Laos
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until 1960, when the full operation had already begun. During 1960, the CIA needed to arrange
several issues, including the allocation of Marine helicopter pilots who more experienced in
flying the H-19s and UH-34 helicopters. Such allocations helped the CIA conduct its operations
in Laos quite easily and allowed the government, through the CIA, to offer support to the Laotian
government, including its elections. The national election in Laos was conducted in 1960, which
favored the introduction of communism in the region.
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Chapter 3:

Long Tieng Airfield

Long Tieng
Laos and the Long Tieng have been acknowledged as the most important assets of the
CIA during the Secret War for several reasons. One of the primary reasons relates to its
geographical position: it was not easily detected due to its mountainous features, and this
allowed the CIA also to introduce Long Tieng airfield, which became one of the busiest airfields
in the world. Another reason is the fact that the region was originally isolated, meaning that it
only had a small population and was thus suitable for the CIA’s operations.
After the full introduction of the CIA in Laos, the government could develop a
headquarters at Long Tieng Valley in support of Major General Vang Pao in 1962. During the
introduction of the headquarters, no inhabitants could regulate operations the CIA conducted.
This idea empowered the CIA to construct a 1260m-long airfield runway beginning in 1964 and
completed in 1966. The airfield, which was originally named Long Tieng, was then identified as
one of the largest US installation sites in a foreign nation. Surprisingly, Long Tieng became one
of the busiest airports in the world by 1970. However, due to tension emanating from the newly
developed airfield, North Vietnam began threatening its existence in late 1971. By late 1971, it
had launched an attack aimed at destroying the airport that employed over 19,000 forces.
North Vietnam’s forces initially attacked the airfield from all four cardinal points,
including the various facilities in the region. Through the attacks, the North Vietnamese forces
captured several positions and facilities belonging to the CIA. In addition, the North Vietnamese
forces later installed antiaircraft batteries; thus, airplanes could not use the airfield again. Despite
the defeat, the CIA-led Thais and a mixture of Hmong and the 10,000 Long Tieng defender
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carried out an attack against the occupying North Vietnamese forces. Although the attack
resulted in approximately 50% causalities, the troops were able to conquer the North Vietnamese
army and regain their positions. Hixson57 has described the scene in his manuscript, concluding
that although the attack was associated with countless deaths and destruction, through the
allocated forces, the CIA could take back their airfield. Long Tieng was considered one of the
most secret places on earth. The airfield was originally located at an elevation of 3,100-feet in a
valley that could easily have cold fogs and chilly nights. Besides, historians have further
described the area as being along mountainous regions that completely surrounded the airfield,
particularly the runway’s northwest side58, which was also covered by several 100-foot karst
outcrops. The headquarters in Long Tieng was nicknamed ‘Sky,’ and all operations regarding the
war were strategically planned and perpetrated there. The term ‘sky’ is believed to have
originated from a CIA officer who called the region ‘the sky’ after his Montana home state,
recognized as the ‘Big Sky Country.’ Besides the existence of the karst outcrops, Long Tieng
was similarly protected by limestone mountains on its other three sides. In addition to being
recognized as one of the CIA’s well-established sites, the airfield is also considered the largest
settlement area of the Hmong, particularly during the Secret War. According to historians, the
Secret War was simply a term defining the approach used by the CIA during the Vietnam War.
Long Tieng’s final defensive outpost was defeated in February of 1975, forcing the US
Brigadier General Heinie Aderholt to order an evacuation of civilians and other key
individuals.59 The US had by then withdrawn all its military personnel and civilians from the
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region except several staff members from the embassy in Laos. Others who had not yet been
removed from Indochina included CIA officer Jerry Daniels, who was initially based at Long
Tieng. The key reason Daniel had not yet been evacuated was that there were limited evacuation
resources, and that existing airplanes were limited to helping locate and evacuate all individuals.
The evacuation is reported to have ended after Jerry Daniels and Major General Vang Pao were
evacuated from Long Tieng. In 1975, the base at Long Tieng was made a restricted Xaisomboun
Special Zone and thus protected by the Laotian military.
In summary, Laos and Long Tieng have been acknowledged as the most important assets
of the CIA during the Secret War for their geographical position and isolation.
Laos operated between 1964 and 1973 as a place where the US government administrated
the greatest aerial bombing attacks in post-WWII history through the CIA. In January of 1955,
the US government introduced the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Vientiane,
which is currently the capital and the largest city in Laos.60 The primary objective of establishing
USOM within the region was to provide foreign aid within the area. By December of 1955, the
CIA had introduced the Program Evaluation Office (PEO) to the area, which was staffed by
military personnel covertly aided by the Agency and even retired military officers. According to
Leary (2006), in terms of cover affairs, the PEO was similar to the Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG), which was organized by USOM officials with the obligation of handling
military aid. The PEO program was later neglected after the US military become the superior
force within the region, leading to MAAG’s establishment. Both MAAG and the PEO were
specifically under the direction of the USOM, which had several different roles linked to
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militarism. Still, in 1955, through the USOM officials, the US government initiated official plans
to help provide supplies to locals who were about to be struck by famine. The supplies, which
included rice and salt, were delivered by three CAT C-46s, and by the end of the year, the CATs
had delivered approximately 1,000 tons of emergency foodstuffs during over 200 missions. The
supply of aid to this region marked an essential point in the occupation of Laos.
The Lima Site 85, also referred to as Long Tieng, was guarded by several companies or
departments linked to the United States and the Royal Kingdom of Laos, including the Hmong
“Secret Army.” According to historical perspective, the Hmong are individuals from an ethnic
group in Southeast and East Asia. During the Vietnam War, the Hmong, who were under the
leadership of Major General Vang Pao, guarded the region of Long Tieng with the help of his
Royal Lao Army. The CIA was also granted the role of guarding Long Tieng by the United
States government; the agency conducted covert and overt operations during the Vietnam War
and had the obligation of protecting the region against the North Vietnamese army, who were
rivals with South Vietnam. With the help of the CIA and the Hmong Royal Army, the United
States Air Force played a significant role in protecting Long Tieng, which was by then
considered the CIA’s most important asset for covert and even humanitarian operations.
During the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force played a significant role in
protecting the region and assisting the CIA in conducting covert and overt operations there. With
the aim of enriching the region’s security, the CIA, with the help of both the United States Air
Force and the Hmong “Secret Army,” established several posts focused on supporting the local
stronghold. Before being expanded to being a Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) in
1966, the Command Post, which was initially created for the CIA, played a significant role in
ensuring that the CIA conducted strategic planning concerning how the ground forces would
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later be allocated further operations. The Command Post was originally tasked with advising the
CIA paramilitary and the Hmong officers on how to deal with the North Vietnamese and the
Pathet Lao, who opposed the existence of the United States Forces in the region. The Command
Post also had the task of refueling United States Air Force rescue helicopters, which were often
used in overt operations.
The Command Post was later expanded to include the TACAN, which were used as air
navigation centers to help protect the region against unexpected air strikes from rival forces. The
areas also helped to controlling aircrafts landing and taking off within the region. Besides the
TACAN and the Command Post, Combat Target was also an important task force established in
March of 1967 to assist the CIA in conducting accurate bombing at night and when the region
was experiencing poor weather. The Combat Target was originally recommended by General
Earle G. Wheeler, and the Reeves instrument Corporation was tasked with modifying the trailermobile for the United States Air Force. Other military inventions aimed at protecting the region
against attacks from rival armies, such as the North Vietnamese soldiers, including Heavy Green,
was a military operation to place a Reeves AN?TSQ-81 Bomb Directing Central and the
Commando Club, which helped in ground-directed bombing (GDB).
According to Sam McGowan’s (2012) 61book, Long Tieng Airfield served several roles
and purposes during the start of the Secret War in Laos. One of these was to be the major and
most frequent landing destination for the C-130s, which also played a significant role during the
Secret War. Besides using airfields such as Sam Thong, Luang Prubang, and Vientiane, Sam
McGowan (2012) 62has acknowledged the airport as one of the most secure airfields within the
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region that served an important role during the Secret War. According to McGowan, “all takeoffs were situated to the southeast side of the airfield whereas all landings were directed to the
northwest side” (McGowan, 2012)63. In addition, the CIA considered Long Tieng beneficial
because it served as the central distribution point for all the supplies brought into the country by
the C-130s. These supplies were supposed to be distributed to local citizens, Hmong who
supported the CIA’s operations in Laos. After the supplies were received in Long Tieng, Air
America took over the distribution to different parts of the country with the help of helicopters.
Furthermore, abesides supplying military equipment, the airfield was also used by the US
government in the distribution of rice and other types of food for the Meo tribesmen, who
represented the most significant percentage of the population in the Laos region.
For decades, Laos and the Long Tieng have been considered the most important assets of
the CIA during the Secret War because of its geographical position. Indeed, has argued that Long
Tieng Airfield was based at “the most secret place on earth.” Fadiman (1997), on the other hand,
has argued that the environmental condition, including its topographical nature, made the site
more favorable for the programs to train the local soldiers to defend their land against the North
Vietnamese government. Another aspect regarding the topographical nature of the region favored
the establishment of a more secure site for the CIA: it was protected on three sides by limestone
mountains, which made it less accessible by roads, particularly when the region experienced
harsh weather conditions. The CIA considered this inaccessibility an advantage because it
reduced the chances of attacks perpetrated by the North Vietnamese forces, thus making it the
most secure place on earth to help launch a war. Although the airfield was later ambushed by
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heavily armed North Vietnamese armies without anticipation, the CIA has always acknowledged
the region as one of the most secure and well-hidden places on earth.
A different reason the region was highly favored is that it was initially isolated and thus
had a small population, making it suitable for the CIA’s operations.64 One reason the region was
less populated is its topographical nature, discussed above. A lower population density meant
that the CIA could conduct covert and overt operations without having to consult the local
community. Such a region is the best to set up a military base since it would ensure that all
military operations were conducted securely without having to worry about the surrounding
population. While assessing such regions, the Long Tien in Laos should be categorized as such
an area.
A different aspect that made the CIA’s establishment of a secure military base successful
is the support it received from the local people and even the local government. During the Secret
War, military operations conducted by the North Vietnamese army were commanded by Major
General Vang Pao, who was by then the commanding officer of the South Vietnamese army.
Major General Vang Pao, who was originally based at Long Tien Valley, had to consider a
strategic approach that would enable him to defeat the North Vietnamese Army, who intended to
link North and South Vietnam. According to him, the most proactive approach was to liaise with
the US government by allowing the CIA to set up a military base at Long Tien to assist them
with the strategic planning of various military actions. Therefore, with the cooperation of Major
General Vang Pao, the CIA could establish a secure site in Long Tieng, which later led to the
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introduction of Long Tieng Airfield. In addition, the cooperation of the local community and
their soldiers from Hmong origins made it easier for the CIA to launch the airfield.
Despite having significantly enriched Laos’s economy during the Vietnam War, the
region currently faces the after-effects of war and poverty. The CIA World Fact Book 2016
notes that only 9% of the country’s current population is over the age of 55, which clearly
indicates the heavy loss of life witnessed through the Vietnam War, hunger, and exile. Therefore,
one of the major effects of conducting covert and overt operations during this period is increased
poverty and death rates in the Laos region. Furthermore, the bombing activities conducted by the
United States Air Force inflicted a significant percentage of the casualties during the Civil War
in the Laos region. Surprisingly, a study recently conducted by the US State Department
concluded that approximately 30% of all the bombs dropped within the region failed to detonate .
Meanwhile, a survey conducted recently claims that, since 1975, approximately 20,000
individuals in Laos have fallen victim to this unexploded ordnance, with 60% of these cases
resulting in death. Such issues have resulted in an increased mortality rate within the region,
which highlight the negative side of the Secret War.
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Chapter 4:

Hmong CIA Collaboration

Hmong History
The Hmong were the crucial part of the CIA’s operation in Laos, but they are little
known to the public. The Hmong is a historically agricultural people who believe they are the
decedents of the 九黎 jiuli, an ancient clan that lived in the middle and lower reaches of the
Yellow River basin. They have their own Voodoo belief and followed their great chief, Chi You,
with whom they battled the coalition between Huangdi and Yandi, the ancestor of the Han clan.
They lost, resulting in the disintegration among the clans and the loss of residence in their
original homeland. The remaining three clans of the Hmong became the main source of most
Hmong people today.
The Hmong is a diasporic group; their population is scattered throughout Eastern and
Southeastern Asia and is mainly settled in Southern China, Vietnam, Laos and the United States.
The Hmong’s diasporic routes mostly originated from China. Historically speaking, from the
Ming Dynasty, the relationship between the Hmong and the central government of China soured
rather early, as the first Ming emperor practiced a cruel and intolerant minority policy. This
intensified the situation, and the Hmong started a revolution; they were dealt severe military
oppression, followed by heavy taxation that left them struggling for lives. They were also
segregated and later displaced from their original home to designated areas with guard posts to
strictly limit the Hmong population movement and economic development. At the height of the
revolution, the Hmong paramilitary groups had over 200,000 personnel. With the arrival of the
Qing Dynasty, the Hmong condition did not improve, as the Manchu ruler sought the same
policies as his predecessor. The Hmong communities began emigrating south over the border of
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the Qing empire and continued to spread across Southeastern Asia. The group that settled in Laos
came through Vietnam, where they often only settled in mountainous areas to avoid conflict with
the locals in the fertile plains. Their immigration was mostly a peaceful process, and the Hmong
tended not to create upset in their new home as foreigners. When it became inevitable, however,
the Hmong fought with determination and advanced technologies they brought from China. In
the dawn of colonial era, when French invaders imposed heavy taxation on the Hmong, they
began to revolt. However, the revolution did not secure their sovereignty, but the French did
recognize their military potential. Later, the Hmong were oppressed by the French-designated
Laotian governor, who also did not favor them.

The Hmong and the CIA Collaboration in the Vietnam War
The Hmong refers to an ethnic group residing in the eastern and southern parts of Asia.
Their origin lies with the Miao people, who encountered official recognition in 1949 from the
legislature of the People’s Republic of China as one of its 55 official minority groups. The CIA’s
covert operations in Laos activated the collaboration between United States soldiers and the
Hmong people who inhabited the mountainous region that the CIA had selected as the fighting
station for the Vietnam War. The CIA agents decided to use the readily available cheap labor to
facilitate the war and thus trained and employed Hmong fighters to enhance their competency in
addition to supplying them with the necessary weaponry.65 This chapter focuses on discussing
the key collaboration between the Hmong people and the CIA. Additionally, the chapter
highlights the centrality of the Hmong individuals and their fighters in the scheme of the
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Vietnam War and the Secret War. This section further discusses how this collaboration forever
transformed the social status of the Hmong.
The Vietnam War mainly involved two key power nations, the United States and the
Soviet Union, who controlled the events in Vietnam and its neighboring countries. Invariably,
the battle between the two parties primarily concerned political aspects following Vietnam’s split
and the surge in power accruing to the communists’ side, as North Vietnam tried to create a
communist nation by forcefully re-linking South Vietnam with the assistance of the Soviet
Union. After the French lost power over Vietnam and decided to leave, a power vacuum
prevailed, which led to the war. According to Leary66, because of the jungle-like terrain in
Vietnam, the United States faced several challenges in preventing China and the Soviet Union
from sending weapons to equip the North Vietnamese in opposition of the South Vietnamese.
The CIA thus turned to the Hmong individuals for assistance in the Vietnam War to oppose
communist insurgents.
As evident from the origin of the Secret War, the CIA’s secret officers relied on the
Hmong guerilla soldiers to counter the Vietnamese communist effort emerging in Laos. The
collaboration between the Hmong and the CIA began with the leadership, when a CIA agent
named Colonel Billy confidentially approached General Vang Pao to command the Special
Guerilla Unit (SGU) to push back the Laotian communists. The collaboration further involved
some verbal agreements between CIA agents and Hmong elders stating that, if the Americans
suffered defeat, then they would search for a new area to facilitate the relocation of the Hmong.67
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Acknowledging the impossibility of winning the disagreement in Vietnam and its
domestic unpopularity, in 1973, on January 23rd, Henry Kissinger, the United States security
advisor, made an accord with the North Vietnamese negotiator terminating the war in Vietnam
without the knowledge of the Hmong military leaders. According to Quincy68, the US retreated
and deserted the Hmong individuals whom they had promised to safeguard in case of an
American defeat. In the Vientiane accord of 1973, the United States government agreed to
disband 18,000 troops, whereas “all the American military advisors prevalent in Laos proved to
because Laos vested under the communist policy. According to Quincy69, the United States spent
nearly 20 billion dollars paying the wages of the ‘workforce’ that facilitated the Secret War in
Laos. Nonetheless, for the remaining Hmong, the ordeal was quite devastating; 35,000 Hmong
individuals died in battle in an effort to defend the United States’ ideology.
Additionally, the United States had little success defeating the North Vietnamese. As a
result, the Hmong population lost the stability of the Vietnamese army, and the tactics
dominating the guerilla warfare were deployed in opposition to the American soldiers prevalent
in Vietnam. Enemies appeared everywhere and were difficult to defeat because the largest
population of the adversaries lacked uniforms and imitated the civilians’ mode of dress. As the
United States engaged in the war, it was concurrently fighting an additional war with people who
were protesting the war. As time elapsed and the United States acknowledged the lack of hope
regarding victory, the U.S. attempted to secure a way to withdraw its troops and eventually
extricate itself from the underlying war. After the enactment of a ceasefire accord between the
two parties in February of 1972, the United States largely evacuated their troops, leaving the
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Hmong allies to fight the North Vietnamese alone. As Quincy70 has argued, after the departure of
the American soldiers, the Hmong genocide soon prevailed.
The Hmong individuals faced recruitment from the CIA to tackle the challenges of the
jungle since they were knowledgeable about the terrain. The CIA further trained the available
Hmong soldiers. The key goal was for the Hmong individuals to fight for the CIA as their
primary ground troops countering the North Vietnamese.71 Moreover, some of the items that the
United States gave the Hmong soldiers were central to the Ho Chi Minch trail. This trail was a
route that facilitated the delivery of weapons to the North Vietnamese; its spider web-like paths
helped prevent tracking and destroying. This analogy provides an additional reason the CIA
employed the Hmong fighters: they were needed to interrupt the transport infrastructure by
destroying bridges and roads to prevent weapons from reaching the adversary.72

The PARU Program
The Hmong project amounted to the operations of the CIA paramilitary specialist, Bill
(James W. Lair). A veteran of WWII, Lair had participated in the CIA, notably at the Korean
War’s eruption. He was assigned to Thailand working as a primary civilian instructor in
conjunction with the Thai Police Sector in a CIA-facilitated program with the aim of improving
the institution’s potential to deal with threats emanating from the communist insurgents.73
Linked to the Border Police, Lair later assisted with distant border outposts. Once the police
units prevalent in the regions of Thailand faced attacks from Communist guerillas, it took
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approximately one week to acquire reinforcements at the station. Lair has also argued that a
better condition would be a parachute-trained unit to handle such emergencies.
Even though the Thai army was unhappy with the perception of the paramilitary police
institution, the Thai government issued an approval of its creation. Acknowledging the Army’s
sensitivity, Lair created an innocuous name for the newly devised institution: the Police Aerial
Reinforcement Unit (PARU). Lair took pride in developing the PARU program.74 He selected an
effective training camp in the southern region of Thailand and initiated a meticulous program
with an aim of creating an elite paramilitary force. In one instance, the PARU program
encountered a danger regarding the loss of CIA support. The intervention of Desmond
FitzGerald, the Far East Division’s Chief in the Clandestine Service, saved the program. The
PARU force reached a population of nearly 400 highly trained people by 1960.
The Entry of Vang Pao
The outstanding Vang Pao was a leader of the Hmong military and commanded the
Tenth Infantry Battalion of the FAR in the PDJ. A talented as well as an ambitious officer, Pao
had come to the Americans’ attention before, in Laos. By April of 1957, the then-PEO chose him
to attend a six-month counterinsurgency training program at the Manila Scout Ranger Base.
Nevertheless, once fighting erupted in Laos at the end of 1959, Pao was concerned that the
Hmong could potentially suffer reprisals from the Communists. The reason for this was the
Hmong’s past close ties with the French. Outsourcing motivation from General Phoumi, and
with help from an American Special Forces group, Vang Pao began establishing a stay-behind
force of the Hmong in the southeastern region of the subject PDJ.75 Once the communists
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invaded and dominated the Plainer, Pao intended to relocate the remaining Hmong to seven other
strategic hilltops surrounding the PDJ.
Acknowledging that Vang Pao sought the assistance of General Phoumi, Lair decided to
investigate the possibility of expanding the program with the subject Hmong commander. By late
December of 1959, Lair had a convention with Vang Pao. The VP, as perceived by the United
States soldiers, argued that he had two options: fighting the Communists or leaving the nation.
Once the US managed to supply the weapons, Pao said that he was ready to fight and able to lead
an army of around 10,000.
In conjunction, Lair made an effective impression on the Hmong commander. He then
returned to the Vientiane after reporting the contact to Gordon L. Jorgensen, the station chief. At
the same time, Desmond FitzGerald was making his move via Vientiane in an effort to reach
Vietnam. Furthermore, Jorgensen has argued that Lair and FitzGerald met to have dinner.
FitzGerald told Lair that the assistance that PARU offered General Phoumi in his campaigns
opposing Kong Le had been worth what the CIA spent on the program. Lair then highlighted a
program aimed at supporting the Hmong.76 FitzGerald asked Lair to write a proposal for the
project and share it with Washington. Even though Lair ‘never had the belief that they would
manage to perform fully,’ he rapidly dispatched an 18-page cable. A positive response, he
remembered, came back in a surprising manner. Lair’s proposal also received support from
Admiral Felt and the State Department. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower, searching for
approaches to prevent one-on-one involvement of the United States in Laos, was willing to go
along with the CIA’s scheme.
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The CIA and the Hmong in the Secret War
The apex of this collaboration occurred when when the Thai military packed over 4,000
Hmong asylum-seekers into trucks and drove them from the refugee camps in Thailand to Laos,
a single-agency state that has been accussed of persecuting the Hmong after backing the
American forces in the Vietnam War.77 Nevertheless, Thailand maintains that the Hmong
residing illegally in the territory are economic migrants rather than political refugees who require
global protection. However, the decision to repatriate them caused global condemnation. Human
Rights Watch called the expulsion “appalling,” while the United States State Department alleged
that the refugees should be safeguarded from the threats that they encountered in their primary
homeland.
Moreover, the incident was the latest phase in the 10-year history of Laos’ communists,
the United States and the Hmong. During the lead-up to the Vietnam War, Northern Vietnam
carved a maze of transportation routes in Laos’ jungles, creating a supply connection later called
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Laos prevailed in the midst of a civil war that emerged between Pathet
Lao, the communist, and the government of the Royal Lao.78 In an effort to disrupt the North’s
supply access routes, the remaining Americans enlisted the aid of the highest-ranking leader of
the Hmong, Vang Pao, in the Royal Lao government. He welcomed the American guns,
expertise and money, and assembled several thousands Hmong fighters from the hills. Jointly,
they could tackle a universal adversary, the communists.
Nevertheless, the partnership was, to a certain extent, operational. The troops from Vang
Pao gained an amplified reputation for being fierce jungle fighters who managed to rescue

77
78

Hillmer, A People’s History of the Hmong. 133.
Shay, “The Hmong and the CIA.”

59

American aircrews, collect military intelligence and fight the communists to reach a stalemate.79
The effort lasted several years and amounted to the largest covert operation of the CIA until the
institution funded the “mujahedin” in opposition to the Soviets dominant in Afghanistan. In
1969, the CIA director, Richard Helms, informed President Richard Nixon that Pao had 39,000
troops involved in active fighting.80 However, casualties were terrible, since the forces of Vang
Pao deployed teens as young as 13 to make sure that their lines were full. An effort was made to
prevent this knowledge from reaching the United States public for years. The Secret War then
had its base, and the Hmong mercenaries formed the war’s secret army.
After the fall of Saigon, the secret army encountered the abandonment of the United
States. In 1975, nearly 10,000 Hmong people were slaughtered at the order of Pathet Lao, the
ascendant. Other Hmong fled to Thailand and the United States, where almost 100,000 Hmong
people resettled. Finally, in 1977, Washington officially acknowledged the valor of the Hmong
soldiers. Moreover, a small stone with a copper plaque was dedicated to their honor between the
Unknown Soldier’s Tomb and John F. Kennedy’s eternal flame in Arlington National
Cemetery.81 However, the plaque did little to resolve the plight of the Hmong in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, thousands of Hmong lived in Thailand in poverty conditions, and some
other armed bands that also inhabited the Laotian highlands refused to submit to the legislature
of Laos. Some signs had been evident that the underlying conflict may have been easing. Vang
Pao, currently 80 and residing in California, said that he wanted to go back home and assist in
reconciling the communist government in Vientiane and the Hmong. However, officials
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reportedly delivered their response that they would welcome him back by executing him.82 This
shows why the Hmong refugees in Thailand continue to worry about the rulers in their
homeland, who still hold a grudge.
The Life of the Hmong People after the Vietnam War and the Secret War
The war with the Pathet Lao ended with the US failures in Vietnam. The signing of the
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam in Paris officially ended the CIA
aid to the Laos, and the US quickly pulled out its personnel and 3,000 high-ranking Hmong.
However, over 30,000 Hmong civilian and the remaining of the combatants were left in Laos. As
the Communists took power in 1975, the Marxist government saw the Hmong as their enemy and
conducted genocide, reducing the population of Hmong to nearly 50%. Most Hmong tried to
seek shelter in other neighboring nations, and some were later transferred to Western countries
through Thailand, as the UN proved their status as political refugees. In 1975, the base at Long
Tieng was made a restricted Xaisomboun Special Zone and thus protected by the Laotian
military.
The Hmong genocide commenced after the Americans had left, and the Hmong
individuals encountered massacres in Laos. Additionally, according to Quincy83, the Hmong
individuals fled and engaged in constant movement because they were afraid of being caught and
killed. A majority of the people passed away in their effort to reach Thailand, which was a safe
refuge for the Hmong amidst the genocide. Thailand allowed the Hmong into their territory as
their only place refuge. However, this did not last long, as Thailand did not want Vietnam and
Laos to think that it was operating in assistance of the Hmong rebels. The Hmong genocide
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occurs even now, since the American soldiers abandoned their intervention in the war.
According to Lloyd-George84, Hmong individuals are currently targeted for assisting the
Americans in the past, and yet the United States ignores the cries for assistance from their former
colleague.
In addition, the Hmong individuals in Thailand and Laos have the feeling of being
betrayed by the United States for being colleagues during the war. The Hmong who survived the
ones who escaped to Thailand and were directed to the concentration camps there, where they
were subject to close monitoring for any possible symptom of a rebellion. Even beyond the
abandonment solely is not adequate, the failure to assist the Hmong when the need arises has
proven to be an outright betrayal. An article published by the Asian American Press revealed that
the Thai government deported over 4,000 refugees back to Laos. The effort that the United States
revealed in response was a speech emanating from Ian Kelly, the spokesman of the United States
State Department, requesting that the Thai government not send the remaining refuges back.85 A
letter from Franken, Feingold, Klobuchar, and several senators to Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Prime
Minister of Thailand, further supported the response. The Thai officials were specifically sending
more than 4,000 Hmong refugees to death, yet the United States did not act.
The life of the Hmong individuals after the war was not very appealing, especially for the
population in Laos, since they continued to encounter threats of being killed. Hmong life in
Thailand ceased to be secure for the refugees since they were deported back to Laos, despite the
fact that life in third-world nations is challenging and dominated by diseases and poverty due to
unsanitary surroundings. Nevertheless, Montlake86 has highlighted how the lucky Hmong
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individuals who succeeded in coming to the United States encountered hardship, since
assimilation is among the hardest aspects for the majority of the Hmong population. Most
Hmong do not understand the United States’ culture, as is shown with the act of kidnapping
women as brides; a few Hmong men ended up in jail in this way. The birthrates are another
challenge as the traditional ages regarding marriage for Hmong individuals are during their
youth. The Hmong are also perceived as having one of the highest rates of individuals living on
welfare, following an inadequate and inappropriate academic system as well as qualifications for
their competency to work. According to Quincy87, the assimilation of Hmong individuals in the
United States faces a key challenge since they become Americanized. The Hmong culture has
rapidly vanished as a result. A large population of Hmong individuals hardly practices their
ancient traditions since their population has converted to various religions in the United States, in
addition to intermarrying into different cultures. The modern Hmong generations are have
quickly lost much of their language as Hmong few know their language’s possibility for
transformation. The United States’ enlisting the Hmong individuals in the Vietnam War
massively influenced the Hmong population in various ways, both positive and negative. In
conjunction with the suffering caused by the defeat, the Hmong also retrieved future that would
pave way for the forthcoming Hmong people’s generations to live besides having better living
standards in the United States. Such Hmong individuals would have opportunities they otherwise
would not.
According to Lloyd-George 88, the social status of the Hmong totally changed after the
end of the Secret War. Invariably, the Hmong lacked food since every day they had to flee for
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their safety; they argue that they are being “hunted like animals” in their homeland. This analogy
was expressed by one weeping elderly woman. Furthermore, the children surrounding the
woman were also crying because their life in Laos was chaotic, and they wanted to meet a
potential savior. Nevertheless, the Hmong continue to suffer the repercussion of joining with the
Americans; they have realized that they are fully cut off from the outside world since the end of
the Vietnam War.
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Conclusion
The collaboration between the CIA and the Hmong is central to fighting the Communists in
Laos. Nonetheless, the location of the Hmong in areas the CIA found secure for launching the
war activated the interaction between the two parties. The Hmong fighters formed the SGU, who
fought confidentially against the Laotian communists; the CIA did not publicize the reality of the
fighters to the United States. Nevertheless, the CIA funded the underlying covert operations for
15 years, besides providing weapons to the Hmong fighters to facilitate the progress of the Secret
War. However, the American soldiers retreated after realizing that they were fighting a losing
battle and failed to notify the Hmong fighters of the confidential retreat. The Hmong people later
encountered harsh living conditions from the Laotian Army for having supported the United
States in fighting Laos’ communists. Massive killing of the Hmong occurred, and the majority of
the Hmong people migrated to Thailand, while some fled to the United States for safety. Their
resulting life was full of dissatisfaction over basic and secondary needs given that finding food
and medicine is a great challenge. The socialization of the Hmong people further encountered
challenging moments after working for 15 years to facilitate execution of the US covert
operations with assistance from the CIA.89 After, they were compelled to constantly run in search
of safety in a nation whose government does not acknowledge their existence. Chor Her is a
victim of the Secret War repercussions as Lloyd-George90 has shown, and she affirms that the
United State provided them weapons and gave them instructions on shooting the adversary.
Waving a battered CIA-provided M79 in the air, the woman expressed great dissatisfaction with
the current social status. The Hmong’s’ painful condition is that the Americans left them, and
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they have been dying gradually ever since. Lloyd-George91 has noted that once the Lao Army
kills one or two Hmong men, they feel they have killed a United States soldier in avenging the
Hmongs’ assistance to the US.
The life of the Hmong people in the war’s aftermath is further dominated by lack of food
and medicine. The Hmong population can hardly meet its basic needs or secondary needs. Food
and medicine are key to human survival, since health is the key to life. As a result, the social life
of the Hmong is full of suppressed needs because the home government is reluctant to show its
concern for the Hmongs’ survival. It is evident that the Hmong fighters were misused by the CIA
to facilitate the Secret War.92 The Hmongs’ achievement from their collaboration with the CIA
was only the deprivation of human rights at home and unfriendly conditions that compelled them
to look for better lives in the surrounding countries. Their uncomfortable life after the Vietnam
War is propagated by the CIA’s betrayal of their fighting spirit. The Hmong people could not
predict such conditions given the massive spending of the CIA on war expenditures and
weaponry measures, which did not hint at a lack of investment in the fighting effort. The CIA
was over-confident that they would be victorious over the North Vietnamese and counter the
communists’ perspective.
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